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ABSTRACT
For more than ten years the so-called Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has been shaping not
only national security strategies, but also influenced the definition of the enemy being fought
as well as the nature of and boundaries between tactics used in this war. While the discussion
about anti-terror strategies and tactics on the political level is ongoing, (empirical) research on
the efficiency and effectiveness of these measures is still limited. In our article, we examine
the relative impact two counter-terrorism approaches – killing and capturing – have on several
measures of effectiveness. Scrutinizing data from 2001-2011 in numerous specifications, we
empirically test to what extent these tactics may have different effects on different aspects of
terrorism. The primary finding of our analysis is that both killing and capturing have
components that have significant positive effects, but that these effects vary based on the
specifics of who states target as well as the terrorists’ own targeting strategies. The most
interesting specific findings are that drone strikes seem counter-productive for counterterrorism and that renditions seem effective, but that traditional policing through enhanced
defenses has the largest effects, which are both positive and negative depending on where one
lives.

INTRODUCTION
On 7 October 2001, following the attacks of 9/11, U.S. President George W. Bush declared a
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). This represented a paradigmatic shift in the approach
most of the West had taken in dealing with terrorism for the past decades. In the face of the
old terrorism, often nationalist and leftist in nature, the dominant approach has been through
1

Both authors affiliated at time of writing with the German Research Institute for Public Administration Speyer.
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traditional policing means, even in states with high terrorist threats such as the UK.2 The
shock arrival of what some labeled “New Terrorism” led the West to shift instead to a warfighting strategy, one already tested in one form or another in many Middle Eastern states;
only in the new GWOT the battle ground would be far from the cities and citizens of war’s
leading participants.

Yet in this war the nature of and boundaries between tactics became as unclear as the
definition of the enemy being fought. Old tactics were imported into new context, while new
tactics and tools were not well understood by the newly empowered actors to which they were
given, whether police or military or security/intelligence services. The GWOT came more and
more to be driven by tactics, the use of which was taken as proof of their effectiveness,
independent of their contribution to strategy and thus to victory. Who to target and how to
target them was left aside for the policy to use every tool, everywhere, against all.

This failure of policymakers and military implementers to integrate tactics and strategy is a
result also of the failure (of academics) to examine and contribute to a scientific
understanding of the relative effectiveness of competing tactics in reducing the incidences and
severity of terrorist acts. While possessing a knowledge base to build upon, the desire to “run
the perfect experiment” limited academics interests in exploring the new and fast evolving
terrain. To remedy this shortcoming, this study examines counter-terrorism strategy in the
Global War on Terrorism (alternatively the War on Terror or “Overseas Contingency
Operation”) from 2001 to 2011 in order determine the relative effectiveness of war-fighting
(killing) versus hard policing (capturing) tactics in reducing the number or severity of terrorist
attacks against different target sets.
More specifically, the article examines the relative impact two counter-terrorism approaches –
killing and capturing – have on several measures of effectiveness. To break war-fighting into
various tactics applied against various targets the study examines troop levels in Afghanistan
and Iraq, drone strikes, and terrorist group decapitations. To examine the range of policing
actions we examine several variants of arrests, those of the traditional sort, renditions, and
numbers of enemy/illegal combatants held. As a control we consider also defensive counterterrorism measures. Because these different tactics may have different effects on different
aspects of terrorism, we use numerous specifications for judging policy effectiveness,
2

David Omand, Securing the State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 98.
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including several measures capturing incidences of terrorist acts and several capturing the
severity and/or complexity of terrorist acts as well as further specifications to consider
differences in aspects among different location. We then compare the different models in
order to draw conclusions given the general difficulty in evaluating counter-terrorism
effectiveness in the face of limited data.

The primary findings of our analysis is that both killing and capturing have components that
have large effects, but that these effects vary based on the specifics of who is targeted (widenet versus targeted) as well as the terrorists’ own targeting strategies (location, type of attack).
The most interesting specific findings are that drone strikes seem counter-productive for
counter-terrorism while renditions seem effective. However, the effects of offensive tactics
were dwarfed by the effect of increased defenses, which reduce attacks in the West in quantity
and quality while redirecting these attacks to other areas in the world, especially the frontline
wars of the GWOT.

BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF STUDY

There is a surprisingly small literature that explores this theme on either a macro-scale, as this
study does, or a micro-scale. What literature does exist generally builds on studies of
repression-rebellion,3 though this literature itself often fails to further specify specific
repression tactics or types.4 Nonetheless this research has informed our perspective on how
various types of repression influence the activities of a targeted group (terrorists, guerrillas,
civil society, etc.), from their mobilization, radicalization, and tactical repertoires5 to whether

3

For example see Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970); Mark I.

Lichbach, “Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent,” Journal of
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1987), pp. 266-297; Erich Weede and Edward N. Muller, “Rebellion,
Violence and Revolution: A Rational Choice Perspective,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1998),
pp. 43-59.
4

Mohammed M. Hafez and Joseph M. Hatfield, “Do Targeted Assassinations Work? A Multivariate Analysis of

Israel’s Controversial Tactic during Al-Aqsa Uprising,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, No. 4
(2006), pp. 359-382, here 360.
5

Christian Davenport, Hank Johnston, and Carol Mueller, Repression and Mobilization (Minneapolis:

University Of Minnesota Press, 2005); Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black
Insurgency, 1930-1970 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to
Revolution (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1978).
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they fragment, disintegrate, or surrender.6 Drawing on these studies, the literature of more
direct relevance to this article’s theme tends to focus mainly, and often even solely, on group
“leaders”7 and whether killing them is effective at reducing group activity (measured in
various ways). Nevertheless, occasionally this literature also looks at whether killing or
capturing such leaders is more effective for counter-terrorism.

Yet while leaders are important, the extent to which they are important varies with many
factors. Most obviously their importance varies based on organizational type and structure,
especially whether the organization is vertically organized and hierarchical or horizontally
organized around “hubs”.8 Byman goes so far as to claim ‘true decapitation is no longer
possible’ given contemporary organizational structures.9 One important scientific finding for
the contemporary GWOT is that leaders matter less in religiously based organizations.10
Given the current primary global terrorist threat is jihadist, this implies a focus on leaders in
an analysis would miss out on possibly more significant factors for the organizational
effectiveness of terrorist groups and thus for counter-terrorism policy.

Yet there are few studies that focus on the larger terrorist organization or movement (aside
from the recruitment literature) and the targeting of its members. However, one factor in the
current literature that somewhat mitigates this oversight is the failure to adapt a uniform
definition of what a leader is in order to thereby identify leaders.11 Some studies focus on only

6

Martha Crenshaw, “How Terrorism Declines,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1991), pp. 69-

87; Jenna Jordan, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,” Security Studies,
Vol. 18, No. 4 (2009), pp. 719-755, here 745.
7

Assaf Moghadam, “How Al Qaeda Innovates,” Security Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2013), pp. 466-497, here 473.

8

Kathleen Carley, Ju-Sung Lee, and David Krackhardt, “Destabilizing Networks,” Connections, Vol. 24. No. 3

(2002), pp. 79-92; Moghadam, “How Al Qaeda Innovates”; Jordan, “When Heads Roll,” p. 729.
9

Daniel Byman (2006) “Do Targeted Killings Work?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2 (2006), pp. 95-111, here

100.
10

Jordan, “When Heads Roll”; Langdon, Lisa; Alexander J. Sarapu and Matthew Wells “Targeting the

Leadership of Terrorist and Insurgent Movements: Historical Lessons for Contemporary Policy Makers,”
Journal of Public and International Affairs, Vol. 15 (Spring 2004), pp. 59-78, here 70; for dissenting opinion see
Bryan C. Price “Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism,”
International Security, Vol. 36, No. 4 (2012), pp. 9-46, here 40.
11

Patrick B. Johnston (2012) “Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in

Counterinsurgency Campaigns,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 4 (2012), pp. 47-79, here 53-4.
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the very top leadership,12 which has the advantage of being more easily defined but the
disadvantage of being less important for clandestine organization, which tend toward flat and
cellular organizational structures. Other scholars take a broader view and look at “operational
leaders”,13 which likely has greater importance for organizational effectiveness in the
immediate term, but which risks improper classification of persons as “leaders”. Because of
this one can find studies that identify as many as 151 targeted killings in 44 months in just one
country14 to other studies that identify only 204 such decapitations over 38 years worldwide.15 This definitional issue arises because, as Lehrke points out, at some level every
combatant (irrespective of whether classified as an enemy combatant or an “unlawful”
combatant) is both a leader and a follower of others.16

Based on this observation, this study attempts to look not only at leaders but also at the larger
terrorist organizations or movements, to first see how war-fighting (killing) versus policing
(capturing) tactics at the macro-level influence the overall GWOT by targeting different
terrorist suspects in different ways. This study seeks to understand the strategic level before
future studies move onto examining the tactical level. It thus avoids comparability issues by
not so much seeking to challenge the current literature directly, but rather to complement it,
push its boundaries, and direct its agenda.

Furthermore, in the above discussion two factors emerged that are of importance when
conducting an analysis of this sort, and especially when differentiating this study from other
studies as well as for deriving policy implications. These are time and location. First is the

12

For example see Langdon, Sarapu, and Wells, “Targeting the Leadership of Terrorist and Insurgent

Movements”.
13

For example see Jordan, “When Heads Roll”. On this also in practice see Byman, “Do Targeted Killings

Work?”
14

Jordan, “When Heads Roll”; compare to Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” who finds 203 killings in the

same country from 2000-05.
15

Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists”. Naturally none of the cited authors claim to have included all decapitations

in their data, but the data differences are still notable and, if nothing else, call into question the comparability of
the studies and their findings.
16

Jesse Lehrke, “A Cohesion Model for Assessing Military Arbitration of Revolutions,” Armed Forces &

Society, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2014), pp. 146-167, here 152 and 156. See also Leonard V. Smith, Between Mutiny and
Obedience: The Case of the French Fifth Infantry Division during World War I (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1994), p.16.
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observation that terrorism is different in every era.17 This is true regarding all of its aspects,
from mobilization and recruitment to strategies and effectiveness. This raises comparability
issues not only across the different studies in the literature, but also within studies that attempt
to examine terrorism across time spans of several decades (often done in order to get more
observations for statistical analysis). In the context of the decapitation literature Mannes
concluded that ‘comparing these [religious] organizations to the relatively small terrorist
radicals in Europe during the Cold War may not be appropriate’.18

This study follows from these observations by examining only the current terrorism era; that
is the era of “New Terrorism” and the Global War on Terrorism following the attacks of 11
September 2001 (hereafter 9/11).19 This era is characterized by high diffuse threats across the
globe20 coming mainly from jihadi affiliated terrorist groups, movements, or inspired cells or
individuals. Nonetheless, one should not neglect that the GWOT has cast a wide-net and
affected all terrorist – as well as criminal and even political – organizations. In many cases it
has also led to more cooperation between even ideological diverse violent political
organizations (though such cooperation has always existed, globalization and the global scope
of the GWOT has merely increased it).21 This wide-net does create some methodological
issues, which will be commented on below.
17

Paul Furlong, “Political Terrorism in Italy: Responses, Reactions and Immobilism,” in Juliet Lodge, ed.,

Terrorism: A Challenge to the State (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981), p. 77; Victor Asal and R. Karl
Rethemeyer, “The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks,” The
Journal of Politics, Vol. 70, No. 2 (2008), pp. 437-449, here 447.
18

Aaron Mannes, “Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing its Leaders Reduce a terrorist

Group’s Activity?” The Journal of International Policy Solutions, Vol. 9 (Spring 2008), pp. 40-49, here 44.
19

Asal and Rethemeyer, “The Nature of the Beast”, 438 with references (Hoffman 1998; Laqueur 1998, 1999,

2004; Lesser et al. 1999; Simon and Benjamin 2000, 2001, 2002). Regarding the ‘post- 9/11 world’, satirist
David Wong notes that ‘The sheer existence of that as an everyday term says it all’, the pervasiveness of which
is easily illustrated by a Google search. David Wong, “The 6 Weirdest Things We’ve Learned Since 9/11,”
Cracked (11 September 2013). Available at: http://www.cracked.com/blog/the-6-weirdest-things-weve-learnedsince-911/ [Accessed 10 September 2014].
20

Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” p. 107; Noëlle Quénivet, “You Are the Weakest Link and We Will

Help You! The Comprehensive Strategy of the United Nations to Fight Terrorism,” Journal of Conflict &
Security Law, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2006), pp. 371-397, here 373, 383. For a concrete example see John Reid quoted in
Mariaelisa Epifanio, “Legislative Response to International Terrorism,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 48, No.
3 (2011), pp. 399-411, here 400.
21

Steven R. David, “Fatal Choices: Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing,” Mideast Security and Policy Studies,

No. 51 (September 2002). See also Paul Cruickshank, Tim Lister, and Per Nyberg, “The last days of a suicide
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This leads to a second important factor, location. As is apparent in its very name, the GWOT
is global in scope. As the United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and
Change pointed out, in today’s globalized world ‘threats are interrelated and a threat to one is
a threat to all’.22 It is thus appropriate to look at data on a global scale. However the effects of
the GWOT are not necessarily global. Jihadi terrorists have targeting preferences which they
strategically choose between. These could be provisionally (and broadly) ranked as being,
first-most, targets in the West itself, then Western targets no matter their physical location,
followed by “collaborationist” regime targets, and so on.23 But states also have some
influence on the location of the fight, for instance, by attempting to deter terrorists through
increased defensive measures24 or creating “honey-pots” to attract terrorist activities to one
(low value) location.25 Following from these observations this study seeks also to compare the
different effects the kill-capture tactics have on different “target sets” across the globe;
perhaps even how a given approach shifts the burden (i.e. cost in terms of lives) of the war to
other locations.

bomber,” CNN Security Clearance, 9 December 2011. Available at: security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/12/09/the-lastdays-of-a-suicide-bomber/ [Accessed 10 September 2014]; F.W. Horst, “Salafist Jihadism in Germany”
(Herzliya, Israel: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2011). Available at:
www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/ 887/currentpage/1/Default.aspx [Accessed 10 September 2014]; Leah
Farrall, “Some thoughts on the printer plot and AQAP,” (The blog formerly known as) All Things Counter
Terrorism (01 November 2010). Available at: http://allthingscounterterrorism.com/2010/11/01/some-thoughtson-the-printer-plot-and-aqap/ [Accessed 10 September 2014].
22

United Nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats,

Challenges and Change. A/59/565(2004) (New York: United Nations, 2004). Available at:
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/historical/hlp_more_secure_world.pdf [Accessed 09 September 2014].
See also Wyn Rees and Richard J. Aldrich, “Contending Cultures of Counterterrorism: Transatlantic Divergence
or Convergence?” International Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 5 (2005), pp. 905–23, here 923.
23

Epifanio, “Legislative Response to International Terrorism,” p. 399 (with reference to Berner 2007).

24

On deterrence in terrorism see Alex Wilner, “Fencing in Warfare: Threats, Punishment, and Intra-war

Deterrence in Counterterrorism,” Security Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4 (2013), pp. 740-772. On its impossibility on a
strategic level see Eric F. Taquechel and Ted G. Lewis, “How to Quantify Deterrence and Reduce Critical
Infrastructure Risk,” Homeland Security Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 12 (2012). Available at:
http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=8.1.12 [Accessed 10 September 2014], 3.
25

Iraq is a possible example. See for example Taquechel and Lewis, “How to Quantify Deterrence and Reduce

Critical Infrastructure Risk”. Compare to the idea of “isolating” in Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?”
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A final issue that has complicated studies of this nature has been the definition of which
organizations to include. As the reader is likely aware, there is no universally accepted
definition of “terrorism”. Likewise, it is difficult to classify whether a given actor is an
organization, a network, a movement, a cell, affiliate, or merely an inspired individual (the
actions of the latter often being classified as mere “crime”).26 Increasingly terrorism has taken
on more of a network format, or even the structure of a movement, with independent terrorist
innovators with fluid organizational affiliations.27 This raises the question of whether one can
or should even study individual terrorist groups. The answers to these questions have not only
political and policy significance,28 but significance for the results of any study relying on
government data at some point in the collection process. This present study, because of its
focus on a macro-level, on the GWOT with its occasionally indiscriminate scope of
targets/suspects, and its resulting reliance on much government data, takes an inclusive
definition that captures many organizational forms using political violence to varying extents
against state actors.29 This approach helps offset the aforementioned wide-net issue.
Nonetheless, we have included some more specified outcomes variables to see if the overall
effects hold true also in more clearly defined jihadi cases (see below).

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

This study draws its insights from the studies in the aforementioned literature strains. The
primary difficulty herein is that one can find a study with evidence supporting almost any
proposition about terrorism. The targeted killing literature is split on whether this specific
tactic is effective or not, even when they agree (which is not often) about how to measure that
effectiveness. More broad research on repression has found it to have ‘every single influence
on behavioral [sic] challenges, including no influence’.30 While we will limit some of these

26

Brian A. Jackson, “Groups, Networks, or Movements: A Command-and-Control-Driven Approach to

Classifying Terrorist Organizations and Its Application to Al Qaeda,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29,
No. 4 (2006), pp. 241-262.
27

Moghadam, “How Al Qaeda Innovates,” pp. 466-7.

28

Jackson, “Groups, Networks, or Movements,” p. 242.

29

For a similar approach see Langdon, Sarapu, and Wells, “Targeting the Leadership of Terrorist and Insurgent

Movements” and Mannes, “Testing the Snake Head Strategy”.
30

Christian Davenport and Molly Inman, “The State of State Repression Research Since the 1990s,” Terrorism

and Political Violence, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2012), pp. 619-34, here 624.
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problems by our temporally delineated yet strategic level global examination of a macro-level
phenomenon, formulating a manageable number of competing hypotheses is challenging.

Before laying out our hypotheses, it is useful to comment on the outcome these will speak
about, as doing so in advance will allow precise wording of the hypotheses that will ensure
they are broad and inclusive enough so as to be few in number, yet flexible enough that we
can expand on them and further specify their different aspects in the discussion. As will be
clear in the statement of the hypotheses, we test for both the number (quantity) of attacks and
the severity (quality) of those attacks (persons killed), as well as some specifications to
elaborate even further on the qualitative sophistication of those attacks (e.g. coordinated
attacks and deaths ratios). Additionally each hypothesis is tested for several different target
sets, meaning many of the quantitative and qualitative outcomes have several different
specifications that differ in their geographical or spatial scope. The outcome variables are laid
out in more detail below.
The first perspective we will consider is that killing is effective.31 Typically following from
the resource endowments perspective of organizational theory,32 this perspective claims that
killing members and affiliates of potentially violent political organizations reduces the
capabilities of the organization to conduct attacks, in terms of their quantity and/or quality.
From another view, killing also functions by increasing costs for a given action and thus
deterring that action.33 Thus advocates of this view hold that:

H1

Killing is effective

Killing more members or affiliates of terrorist organizations leads to less numerous
and/or severe terrorist attacks for a given target set.

31

Asal and Karl Rethemeyer, “The Nature of the Beast”; Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work?”; Langdon,

Sarapu, and Wells, “Targeting the Leadership of Terrorist and Insurgent Movements,” p. 75; Price, “Targeting
Top Terrorists”. Note that the arguments and findings of all authors cited in this section are more complex than
presented here; none claim a straight linear relationship or that the policy they found to be best is a “silver
bullet”.
32

Hafez and Hatfield, “Do Targeted Assassinations Work?” pp. 365-6.

33

Hafez and Hatfield, “Do Targeted Assassinations Work?” with references (Hibbs 1973; Oberschall 1973;

Oliver 1980; Hardin 1982).
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There is a counter-argument that killing is not only ineffective, but even counter-productive
for all purposes except maybe some psychological needs (e.g. revenge).34 This perspective is
often rooted in theories of backlash mobilization.35 In this view, those killed become martyrs
for the cause and increase a group’s recruitment potential and radicalization while also
inspiring revenge attacks.36 An additional interesting perspective on this is that killing group
members, especially leaders, can make way for younger members, who may be more
innovative and, moreover, more risk-loving/seeking.37 Lastly there is a view that such
killings, which represent a threat, drive a group to become more cohesive and to go further
underground, both of which tend to make a group more dangerous, though possibly less
effective at sophisticated operations.38 Thus there is the possibility that:

H1A

Killing is counter-productive

Killing more members or affiliates of terrorist organizations leads to more numerous
and/or severe terrorist attacks for a given target set.
However, the manner of killing and target of repression matter for outcomes.39 Thus we will
consider several variants of the overall “kill” approach. Broadly these are: drone strikes,
decapitations, and troop levels (each with sub-components discussed in the variable section
below). Regarding decapitation, these might reduce quality while increasing quantity due to

34

Hafez and Hatfield, “Do Targeted Assassinations Work?”; David, “Fatal Choices”.

35

Davenport, Johnston, and Mueller, Repression and Mobilization; Ronald A. Francisco, “The Relationship

between Coercion and Protest: An Empirical Evaluation in Three Coercive States,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution, Vol. 39 (June 1995), pp. 263-282; Ronald A. Francisco, “Coercion and Protest: An Empirical Test in
Two Democratic States,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 40 (November 1996), pp. 1179-1204. See
also Hafez and Hatfield, “Do Targeted Assassinations Work?” with references to Gamson et al., 1982, Goldstein
1983, and Oliviers 1990, 1991.
36

Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” p. 99.

37

For the example of ETA see Alexander Spencer, The Problems of Evaluating Counter-Terrorism, UNISCI

(Research Unit on International Security and Cooperation) Discussion Papers, No. 12 (Madrid: Universidad
Complutense Madrid, October 2006). Available at: http://epub.ub.unimuenchen.de/13771/1/UNISCISpencer12.pdf [Accessed 10 September 2014].
38

Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones, “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks,” International

Security, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2009), pp. 7-44; Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists”. See also the military sociology
literature on group cohesion.
39

Langdon, Sarapu, and Wells, “Targeting the Leadership of Terrorist and Insurgent Movements,” p. 75; Hafez

and Hatfield, “Do Targeted Assassinations Work?” p. 363 (with reference to Mason and Krane 1989).
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the symbolic importance of the deaths, the aforementioned risk-seeking of younger
successors, and a simultaneous reduction in organizational capability (i.e. ability to conduct
sophisticated operations).

Drone strikes are perceived by a population to be a very one-sided, unfair, and unjust means
of exemplary and even punitive power, one which often has collateral damage associated with
it. Hafez and Hatfield (2006) associate such unjustness and perceived inability to fight back as
contributing to a perception of severity and thereby to the potential for backlash
mobilization.40 Thus, drone strikes also may lead to an increase in quantity of attacks while
reducing their severity.

The influence of troop levels is more complicated. On the one hand it increases the number of
targets and thus can be expected to increase terrorist activity in the short-term at least and for
the target set of countries where troops are active. On the other hand their presence should
over time reduce terrorist activity, either because terrorists are killed or captured or because
they engage in inter-temporal transference and go underground for a period of time.

Moving on, another school of thought holds that capturing terrorists is a more effective
counter-terrorism tactic.41 This group often cites the prominent examples of the Shining Path,
PKK, and Red Brigades as proof of the success of arresting leaders in particular. Capturing is
seen as limiting backlash mobilization. Furthermore, this view holds that captured individuals
can provide intelligence that enable follow-on counter-terrorism operations and thus reduce
terrorist activity.42 There is also a view that, especially regarding leaders, seeing ones
comrades imprisoned and in control of the state can lead to demoralization amongst a group.43
This view thus holds that:

40

Hafez and Hatfield, “Do Targeted Assassinations Work?” p. 378.

41

Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,” International

Security, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2006), pp. 7-48, here 22; Jordan, “When Heads Roll,” p. 736; Mannes, “Testing the
Snake Head Strategy”.
42

Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” pp. 98-9; on killings’ damage to Israeli intelligence operations see

David, “Fatal Choices,” p. 10.
43

Cronin, “How Al-Qaida Ends,” p. 30; Steve Hutchinson and Pat O’Malley, How Terrorist Groups Decline

(Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, Norman Paterson School of International
Affairs, Carleton University, 2007), p. 6. See also Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists”.
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H2

Capturing is effective

Capturing members or affiliates of terrorist organizations leads to less numerous
and/or severe terrorist attacks for a given target set.

There is less theory behind the next hypothesis, but it must be considered for balance. This
view would thus hold that capturing terrorists leads to more terrorist activity. Perhaps a group
is inspired to engage in more actions in order to gain leverage over the state and thus negotiate
for the release of their comrades. There is also, especially among younger persons imprisoned
for minor terrorist support activities, the risk of radicalization while imprisoned and a
retrenched commitment to more severe terrorist activity upon re-release.44 Thus, this
perspective would claim that:

H2A

Capturing is counter-productive

Capturing more members or affiliates of terrorist organizations leads to more
numerous and/or severe terrorist attacks for a given target set.

The manner of capturing may be less critical as the manner of killing in influencing outcomes,
but nonetheless we consider several factors that broadly fall in the areas of: arrests, prisoners
of war (POWs), and renditions. Arrests as such are mostly captured in H2 and H2A. However,
differentiation will be made between arrests made in the West, versus arrests made in the rest
of the world, and the total of both, as this may affect our various target sets differently. The
effect of POWs is also captured in H2 and H2A, but this also would most likely affect the
target set in war zones and less so targets in the West. Renditions represent a perceived
injustice, but tend to be used only against high-value terrorist suspects. Thus, they may be
likely to provoke a similar effect as decapitation: a higher number of attacks, but a lower
44

See for example Greg Hannah, Lindsay Clutterbuck, and Jennifer Rubin, Radicalization or Rehabilitation:

Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners (Cambridge, UK: RAND Europe, 2008).
Available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR571.html [accessed 08 September 2014]; Elizabeth
Mulcahy, Shannon Merrington, and Peter Bell, “The Radicalisation of Prison Inmates: Exploring Recruitment,
Religion and Prisoner Vulnerability,” Journal of Human Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2013), pp. 4-14; Peter R.
Neumann, Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries (London, International
Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, Kings College, 2010). Available at:
http://icsr.info/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/1277699166PrisonsandTerrorismRadicalisationandDeradicalisationin15Countries.pdf
[Accessed 08 September 2014].
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quality of those attacks. However, the secrecy around renditions may lead to uncertainty in a
terrorist group that could lead them to rearrange their plans for fear they have been
compromised.

While this study focuses its examination on two policies that could be classified as falling on
the offensive side of counter-terrorism activities – killing and capturing – there is also a
defensive side to counter-terrorism45 and it is possible it is increased defenses that have
contributed most to counter-terrorism.46 The defense perspective thus claims that:

H3

Defenses are effective

Increased defensive measures among preferred target states lead to less numerous
and/or severe terrorist attacks for a given target set.
However, given the phenomena of target transference or substitution,47 it is possible that such
defensive measures are simply re-directing terrorist activities to another target set. Thus,
through different specifications of the outcome variables, we will consider also the possibility
that:

H3A

Defenses are not ultimately effective

Increased defensive measures among preferred target states lead to more numerous
and/or severe terrorist attacks for a given target set.

It goes without saying that we are also open to the null hypothesis that any one or all of the
above factors have no significant influence at all.48 It is also possible that all the hypotheses
are true (though their level of influence would still vary), in which case we will pay special

45

Todd Sandler and Kevin Siqueira, “Games and Terrorism: Recent Developments,” Simulation & Gaming, Vol.

40, No. 2 (2009), pp. 164-192, here 165.
46

Hafez and Hatfield, “Do Targeted Assassinations Work?” p. 378.

47

Subhayu Bandyopadhyay and Todd Sandler, “The Interplay between Preemptive and Defensive

Counterterrorism Measures: A Two-Stage Game,” Economica, Vol. 78, No. 311 (2011; online first 2009), pp.
546-564, here 548; Sandler and Siqueira, “Games and Terrorism,” pp. 334, 338, 340.
48

For example Hafez and Hatfield, “Do Targeted Assassinations Work?” find no effect.
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attention to how specific variables used to capture each hypotheses may interact with each
other and be used to form part of an integrated and balanced counter-terrorism policy.49

In way of qualification, while this study will reveal the relationship between the independent
variables and the outcome variables, it cannot definitively say what the outcome variables
themselves mean for the ultimate success of the GWOT. For example, while a reduction in the
number of attacks may be seen as indicating policy effectiveness, it could instead simply
indicate inter-temporal transference50 as terrorist groups with ‘cosmic’ time-frames51 wait for
a better opportunity to strike, possibly devoting their time and energy to planning a
spectacular event.52 Likewise, more attacks may not indicate that a policy has failed and
terrorism is on the upswing, but rather that groups are in their “death throws” and making one
last desperate push.53 These longer term questions must wait for the accumulation of more
time and data before they can be answered.

DATA AND VARIABLES

As always when researching the murky world of terrorism and counter-terrorism the
collection of data is problematic.54 For many variables we were able to obtain fairly precise
numbers, though the use of year data rather than month data obscures much variation. For
other variables where data was more difficult to obtain we used the officially reported
49

Bandyopadhyay and Sandler, “The Interplay between Preemptive and Defensive Counterterrorism Measures,”

p. 24; Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” especially p. 107; Hafez and Hatfield, “Do Targeted
Assassinations Work?” p. 365; Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work?”; Mannes, “Testing the Snake Head
Strategy,” especially p. 44. Note the page references for Bandyopadhyay and Sandler 2009[2011] are taken from
the publically available 2009 version.
50

Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, The Political Economy of Terrorism, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2012), especially p. 177; Todd Sandler, Daniel G. Arce, and Walter Enders, Transnational
Terrorism: Copenhagen Consensus 2008 Challenge Paper (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Consensus Center, 2008).
Available at: http://create.usc.edu/research/58253.pdf [Accessed 10 September 2014], p. 27.
51

Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Oakland, CA:

University of California Press, 2003).
52

For a related point and methodological implications see Mannes, “Testing the Snake Head Strategy”.

53

Spencer, “The Problems of Evaluating Counter-Terrorism”.

54

Daniel G. Arce, Rachel T.A. Croson, and Catherine C. Eckel, “Terrorism experiments,” Journal of Peace

Research, Vol. 48, No. 3 (2011), pp. 373-82, here 373; Spencer, “The Problems of Evaluating CounterTerrorism,” p. 186.
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numbers even if these were likely underestimates (rarely the reverse). For qualitative
determinations by the authors we also went with low estimates. We would rather report no
significant findings and call for future research than report a significant finding where none
exists (and thereby possibly influencing policy in the wrong way).

As this is a macro-level study some of the data is aggregated in a way which may obscure
certain critical details, but this data is often only available in this fashion. A prime example
would be the false classification of persons, organizations, and acts as “terrorist(s)” for
political purposes or ex-post justification of counter-terrorism actions, which would inflate the
numbers. Rather than try to fight this tendency, we chose to focus on the strategic GWOT
level and thus also chose a dataset for our outcome variables that errs on the side of
inclusiveness (see below). However, when possible we included some outcome specifications
to look for a specific jihadi effect. The following sections describe the variables and any
choices regarding their specification made by the researchers. Information on the data sources
beyond what appear in the footnotes can be found in the publically available codebook.55

War-fighting Kill Approach

Decapitation

For decapitation (DECAPITATION), as non-area experts and to prevent correlation with
other variables, we include only the very top leader(s), high-level “operational” leaders, or
leaders of core elements or areas (i.e. ones critical to the organization and often with a
dominating influence in the organization). However, given the non-hierarchical organization
of many terrorists groups, occasionally other leaders were also counted if their positions were
verifiably senior and high profile. We hope this focus prevents us from being swayed by
government and media reports claiming every terrorist killed was a “senior leader”. It also
prevents us from focusing on deaths in organizations which receive more media coverage; top
leader deaths are most likely reported even for minor groups, while lower leader deaths will
be reported only for high-profile terrorist campaigns. Despite that the effects on an
55

Codebook available at: https://www.dropbox.com/s/qh3h2ndddz6361s/Kill%20-

%20Capture%20Codebook.doc?dl=0
Dataset available at: https://www.dropbox.com/s/xs3h9t9g3n7ujxd/KillCapture%20Dataset%2008.09.2014.xls?dl=0
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organization of deaths of leaders not attributable to counter-terrorism activities may have an
effect on a terrorist group’s activities, we chose not to include deaths of leaders from natural
causes or internal disputes (the latter especially prevalent in al-Shabaab and the Continuity
IRA). We include only terrorist groups on the US Department of State Foreign Terrorist
Organization list, but excluded decapitations in the New People’s Army, Shining Path, and
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam due to data concerns (lack of data or too many government
claims of successful high-value targeted killing).

Drone Strikes

The variable DRONE_STRIKES uses relatively new data from the New America Foundation
to look at the annual number of drone strikes in Pakistan and the border with Afghanistan,
while YEMEN_STRIKES looks at the number of aerial strikes (drone and manned) in Yemen
and STRIKES_TOTAL combines the two.56 Likewise DRONE_DEATHS_AVERAGE
(MILITANTS) looks at the number of militants (not civilian collateral damage) killed in
drone strikes annually in the Pakistan region while the YEMEN_DEATHS (MILITANTS)
variable does the same for Yemen.57

Troop Levels

This variable looks at annual troop levels in the two primary wars associated with the GWOT:
Afghanistan and Iraq (AFG_FOR_TROOPS and IRAQ_US_TROOPS).58 These numbers
56

New America Foundation, Year of the Drone Pakistan Data Site (2013). Available at:

http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones [accessed 18 June 2013].
57

Additional variables included in the dataset but not used in the analysis here include:

DRONE_DEATHS_MILITANTS(TOTAL) as well as DRONE_DEATHS_CIVILIAN(LOW)
DRONE_DEATHS_CIVILIAN(HIGH). The later uses data from: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Get
the data: What the drones strike (2014). Available at: http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2014/05/23/get-thedata-what-the-drones-strike/ [accessed 08 September 2014]. The inclusion of civilian deaths is especially
recommended for future studies.
58

Source for Afghanistan data: Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, “Afghanistan Index: Also Including

Selected Data on Pakistan,” Brookings Tracks Reconstruction and Security in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan
(Washington,

D.C.:

The

Brookings

Institution,

2012).

Available

at:

http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index [Accessed 30 April 2014]. For Iraq

64

Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies
Vol. 17, Issue No. 2, May 2015

were taken as a proxy for the number of potential “terrorists” killed, since neither the US nor
its allies report enemy “body counts”. Note that for Iraq we choose not to include the number
of non-US foreign troops due to their high volatility over short-time frames, while in
Afghanistan we consider only total foreign troops given this war was much more of a
coalition endeavor. All troop levels are so-called “boots on the ground”, not troops in the
“operations area” (e.g. aboard ships, nearby airbases). The data we gathered has much more
variation than what some other scholars use, but is still annual data, an issue we return to
later.59

Policing Capture Approach

Arrests

This variable draws on new and only recently available data collected by the Associated Press
which we then sought to verify and supplement as required (especially when zeros were
reported for a country-year).60 We divided this data into three variables capturing annual
data: Christopher Blanchard and Catherine Marie Dale, Iraq: Foreign Contributions to Stabilization and
Reconstruction, CRS Report for Congress, RL32105 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service,
2007). Available at: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/99533.pdf [accessed 08 September 2014]. For
both countries: Amy Belasco, Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other
Potential Issues, CRS Report for Congress, 7-5700 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2009).
Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40682.pdf [Accessed 30 April 2014].
59

As time progressed security responsibilities were gradually handed over to domestic forces and to capture this

we also include in the dataset an annual count of the number of domestic security forces
(AFG_SECURITY_FORCES and IRAQ_SECURITY_FORCES). However, we do not include analysis of this
issue and data in this paper. Sources include Anthony H. Cordesman, Sam Khazai, and Daniel Dewit, Shaping
Iraq’s Security Forces (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013). Available at:
http://csis.org/files/publication/131213_Iraq_Security_Forces.pdf [Accessed 30 April 2014]; James L. Jones
(Chairman), The Report of the Independent Commission of the Security Forces of Iraq (Independent Commission
of the Security Forces of Iraq, 6 September 2007). Available at: http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf
[Accessed 30 April 2014].
60

Associated Press, Anti-terror Arrests [Data file], last updated 29 September 2011 (2012). Available at:

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/254008-anti-terror-arrests-raw-data.html [accessed 18 June 2013].
Supplemented (especially when AP reported zeros and for 2011) with US Department of State annual country
terrorism reports (http://www.state.gov/g/ct/rls/crt/) and EUROPOL EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports
(https://www.europol.europa.eu/search/apachesolr_search/EU%20terrorism%20situation%20and%20trend%20re
port).
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number of arrests on terrorism charges worldwide (ARRESTS_TOTAL), the number of these
arrests in Western countries (ARRESTS), and the number of arrests made in the rest of the
world (ARRESTS_ROW), though only the first two are used in any regressions.61 We also
examine a count of arrests of high-value persons (ARRESTS_KEY), though our definition of
“high value” was very restrictive.

Renditions

The variable RENDITIONS includes the annual number of persons subjected to extraordinary
rendition according to a recently released report.62 In addition to numbers of persons in the
program we also divided the rendition program into five phases (RENDITION_REGIME)
based on which legal framework covered it. These frameworks, which generally restricted
rendition policy as time passed, are: no framework to August 2002; first Justice Department
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) (“Bybee”) memo from August 2002; second OLC memo from
December 2004; Bush’s Executive Order (EO) of July 2007 reauthorizing the program but
with a few more constraints; and Obama’s EO from January 2009 (no torture, detention
facilities closed, etc.).63

POWs
61

We include in the dataset also information on US prosecutions on terrorism charges (US_PROSECUTIONS)

and the number of legal extraditions to the US from other countries (EXTRADITIONS_US(CONVICTED)).
However, this data was not included in our analysis as their inclusion raised certain biases or correlation issues
with variables of more central concern to our examination. Data from: Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse (TRAC), As Terrorism Prosecutions Decline, Extent of Threat Remains Unclear (Syracuse, NY:
TRAC Reports, Inc., 2010). Available at: http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/231/ [Accessed 30 April 2014];
The Washington Post, “Terrorism Convictions in U.S. Courts,” 30 March 2013. Available at:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/terrorism-convictions-in-uscourts/2013/03/30/2174b072-9983-11e2-814b-063623d80a60_graphic.html [Accessed 30 April 2014].
62

Open Society Justice Initiative, Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition (New

York: Open Society Foundations, 2013). Available at:
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/globalizing-torture-cia-secret-detention-and-extraordinaryrendition [Accessed 10 September 2014]. We also experimented with lagging this variable given the secrecy of
the programme and its possible provision of longer-term intelligence (RENDITIONS_LAG) but this did not
prove useful. Nonetheless, the variable is retained in the dataset.
63

In a simpler attempt to capture the legal regime we included a dummy for whether it was before 2006, or 2006

and later (RENDITION_POST2006), as this was the year that the rendition programme became public and thus
controversial. However, this variable does not appear in the analysis.
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This variable captures the estimated annual number of prisoners of war (TOTAL_POWS)
held in relation to the war on terror. Though not used in our analysis we include in the dataset
also sub-variables that break the total down for scholars interested in a finer analysis. The
sub-variables look at prisoners held in Bagram Theater Internment Facility, also called the
Parwan Detention Facility, in Afghanistan (BAGRAM); Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp in
Cuba (GITMO)64; and all prisoners held at facilities in Iraq (IRAQ_PRISONERS).

Defensive Approach

The control variable for defensive measures (DEFENSES_LAGGED) is taken from
Epifanio’s Legislative Response to International Terrorism (LeRIT) dataset.65 LeRIT uses a
dummy variable to code for the presence/absence of thirty different possible restrictive
regulations that are used for defensive counter-terrorism purposes in 20 OECD countries.66
The majority of these regulations are intended to deter through punishment or denial and thus
should not correlate directly with arrests. Since our focus is global, with special concern for
Western targets, we take the annual average. We lag this by one year given implementation
times for such regulations. Data was not available for the final two years, thus we kept the
numbers constant pending further research.

Outcome Variable: Attack Quantity and Quality

The outcome variables are drawn from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the

64

The New York Times and NPR, The Guantánamo Docket (2014). Available at:

http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo [Accessed 30 April 2014].
65

Epifanio, “Legislative Response to International Terrorism”. Data available at: http://www.prio.no/Research-

and-Publications/Journal-of-Peace-Research/Replication-Data/.
66

For a list of these regulations see: http://www.polsci.org/epifanio/codebook.pdf. On the defensive nature of

these measures see Eric Neumayer, Thomas Plümper, and Mariaelisa Epifanio, “The ‘Peer-Effect’ in
Counterterrorist Policies,” International Organization, Vol. 69, No. 1 (2014), pp. 209-32. Available at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2107192 [accessed 10 September 2014], here 13 (page
reference from publically available version).
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University of Maryland.67 As mentioned, this dataset errs on the side of inclusiveness.68 In
combination with underestimating any questionable independent variables, this should ensure
we do not overstate the significance of any findings. For brevity the outcome variables are
best outlined in table form (Table 1). The variations on possible outcomes include
specifications not only of total attacks, but also of attacks in specific places (or total minus
specific places, e.g. war zones) and by specific ideologically oriented groups (i.e. jihadists) as
well as several deaths-per-attack ratios (capturing a degrading terrorist capability even in the
presence of backlash mobilization) and coordinated attack variables (capturing organizational
capability). As will be discussed in the methodology section below, we ran numerous models
with different independent and outcome variables, often using the results of previous models
to guide the next model and discover possibly interesting relationships. We believe that by
comparing the models in light of our theory we can draw some conclusions on policy
effectiveness even given how difficult this is to do for counter-terrorism due to data
limitations and questions about what effectiveness even means. Not all outcome variables
proved useful for the current analysis and Table 1 indicates which appear only in the dataset.

Table 1

Outcome Variables (italics indicates inclusion in dataset but not analysis)

ATTACKS_TOTAL (IN_WEST)

Terrorist attacks in Western countries, annual count

ATTACKS_TOTAL

Terrorist attacks against Western targets worldwide, annual count

(WESTERN_TARGET)
ATTACKS_JIHADI

Jihadist terrorist attacks against Western targets worldwide, annual

(WESTERN_TARGET)

count

ATTACKS_WORLD_JIHADI

Total Jihadist terrorist attacks worldwide, annual count

ATTACKS_WORLD_TOTAL

Total terrorist attacks worldwide, annual count

ATTACKS_WARZONES

Total terrorist attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, annual count

ATTACKS_WORLD_TOTAL-WARS

Total terrorist attacks worldwide excluding those in Iraq and
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National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Global Terrorism

Database [Data file] (2013). Available at: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd [Accessed 18 June 2013].
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Afghanistan, annual count

ATTACKS_COORDINATED_WORLD Total terrorist attacks consisting of multiple simultaneous coordinated
attacks, annual count

DEATHS_IN_CORD-ATTACKS

Total deaths in coordinated attacks, annual scale

DEATHS-PER-CORD-ATTACK

Deaths-per-coordinated attack, annual scale

DEATHS_WORLD

Total deaths in terrorist attacks worldwide, annual scale

DEATHS-PER-ATTACK

Deaths-per-terrorist attack worldwide, annual scale

METHODOLOGY AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

For the quantitative analysis we tried several different types of regression analysis to capture
the effects of different explanatory factors on the dependent variables. A simple Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) (cross-sectional analysis) fits the data quite well, which we consider an
advantage given this methods accessibility to the non-quantitatively inclined. To see in how
far other approaches may fit the data better, we also included non-linear models and other
distributions which are more tolerant against data bias (Poisson model/Negative Binomial
model), but did not find improved results.
For each dependent variable, we stepwise included – starting with RENDITIONS – additional
variables into our analysis to see in how far the overall fit of the model improves, and in how
far these additional variables are significant, contributing to the explanatory value of the
model. However, as pointed out by Mannes amongst others, counter-terrorism tactics (our
variables) are rarely pursued in isolation but occur as part of an integrated campaign or
simultaneous crackdown on multiple fronts.69 This leads to some correlation between
independent variables. In these cases we selected the one which we included – due to the high

69

Mannes, “Testing the Snake Head Strategy.”

69

Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies
Vol. 17, Issue No. 2, May 2015

degree of correlation also proxying for the other indicators – while the other variables were
used for robustness tests.

In total approximately two dozen regressions contributed to our analysis (not all displayed),
while we experimented with numerous other specifications to ensure our approach was
scientifically best. Our purpose in running such a number of regressions was to ensure
consistency of the findings across differently specified models and thereby draw conclusions
even given the small dataset. Overall all models gave more or less the expected confirmation
of the results of models displayed below, most importantly: significant coefficients, consistent
direction of the sign, and a high explanatory value of the model, expressed e.g. in a high R².

The results of the most illuminating and significant models are displayed in the Tables 2 and
3, with the former focusing on results with “quantitative” outcomes, as in numbers of attacks,
and the latter on “qualitative” outcomes, as in severity/complexity of attack. This manner of
presentation was chosen to facilitate comparison of the kill and capture independent variables,
as well as comparison of target sets, as these comparisons were most interesting (versus
comparing quantitative and qualitative outcomes). Table 4 presents a final check of the most
significant findings against one another, including also a final check on another specification
of arrests. These and the results of other models not displayed, and moreover the relationship
between the models, are discussed in detail in the following section.
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Table 2

Results of statistical analysis (quantitative outcomes)

VARIABLE

CONSTANT

i

ii

Iii

iv

V

vi

vii

ATTACKS_

ATTACKS_

ATTACKS_

ATTACKS_

ATTACKS_

ATTACKS_

ATTACKS_

WORLD_TOTAL

WORLD_TOTAL

TOTAL(IN_WEST)

WARZONES

WARZONES

WARZONES

WARZONES

1721,861

1854,026*

352,883***

-223,779

-199,139

-228,593

-95,269

(1397,484)

(754,736)

(71,254)

(246,606)

(251,734)

(162,364)

(202,975)

,228**

,009**

,010

,012

(,068)

(,003)

(,007)

(,008)

-36,182

-13,840

-1,228

-11,103**

-10,577 **

-12,762**

-9,223**

(25,055)

(13,423)

(1,219)

(4,038)

(3,884)

(2,326)

(3,028)

15,459

-63,461

-3,753

3,831

(78,479)

(50,152)

(4,444)

(13,434)

ARRESTS_TOTAL
ARRESTS_WEST

,657
(1,562)

RENDITIONS
DECAPITIZATION
DRONE_STRIKES

21,054*

3,575*

5,206**

5,783*

(10,129)

(1,653)

(2,474)

(2,322)

15,069

YEMEN_STRIKES

(16,498)
2,106*

DRONE_DEATHS_

(,772)

AVERAGE
(MILITANTS)

-42,385

YEMEN_DEATHS

(18,719)

(MILITANTS)
DEFENSES_LAGGED

102,798

-165,199

-59,765**

272,196***

254,648**

324,848**

167,128*

(423,661)

(198,089)

(16,752)

(54,814)

(75,403)

(89,903)

(71,487)

,005

TOTAL_POWS
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(,011)
,003

AFG_FOR_TROOPS

(,003)
-,004*

IRAQ_US_TROOPS

(,001)
R²

,863

,971

,756

,978

,975

,996

,989

R² corr.

,726

,912

,560

,955

,958

,988

,974

Significance: * <10 per cent level, ** <5 per cent level, *** <1 per cent level
OLS Regressions
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Table 3

Results of statistical analysis (qualitative outcomes)
i

ii

iii

DEATHS_WORLD

DEATHS_IN_

DEATHS-PER-

CORD-ATTACKS

CORD-ATTACK

9597,011**

4934,755***

17,270***

(3032,607)

(474,681)

(2,814)

-108,789*

-44,179***

-,123**

(46,786)

(7,323)

(,043)

13,427

6,430

,001

(29,803)

(4,665)

(,028)

-633,627

-849,485***

-2,840**

(908,374)

(142,184)

(,843)

,172

,035

7,275E-005

(,131)

(,020)

(,000)

R²

,735

,915

,833

R² corr.

,558

,858

,721

VARIABLE

CONSTANT
ARRESTS_TOTAL
ARRESTS_WEST
RENDITIONS
DECAPITIZATION
DRONE_STRIKES
YEMEN_STRIKES
DEFENSES_LAGGED
TOTAL_POWS
AFG_FOR_TROOPS
IRAQ_US_TROOPS

Significance: * <10 per cent level, ** <5 per cent level, *** <1 per cent level
OLS Regressions
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Table 4

Final check: regression including core findings and alternate arrests data

VARIABLE

i

ii

iii

ATTACKS_WORLD_

ATTACKS_WORLD_

ATTACKS_WORLD_

TOTAL

TOTAL

TOTAL

2893,453***

1732,416

2622,016***

(366,618)

(1183,653)

(370,196)

-42,678**

-30,170

-60,033***

(14,672)

(18,973)

(16,925)

22,103***

19,459**

20,555***

(6,066)

(6,563)

(5,573)

CONSTANT
RENDITIONS
STRIKES_TOTAL

252,512

DEFENSES_LAGGED

(244,873)
185,209

ARRESTS_KEY

(111,655)
R²

,841

,862

,886

R² corr.

,801

,803

,837

Significance: * <10 per cent level, ** <5 per cent level, *** <1 per cent level
OLS Regressions

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

There are numerous challenges inherent in studying counter-terrorism effectiveness. In this
study these are addressed by taking a broad and aggregated approach, but these means that the
finding cannot be as precise as in studies with less methodological hurdles. However, while
we cannot report the exact influence of each independent variable on a given dependent
variable, by running numerous models with varying specifications we can be confident in how
a given variable influences terrorist activity, i.e. the direction and broad magnitude. Bringing
together these individual observations we can then draw out larger observations about the war
on, or policing of, terrorism.

War-fighting Kill Approach

The strongest finding regarding the war-fighting approach is that drone strikes have a large
positive and significant effect on the total number of attacks worldwide: more drones strikes
lead to an increased number of attacks. This was true of drone strikes in Pakistan (in two
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models) and even more so for total strikes. However, strikes in Yemen alone are not
significant, likely due to their smaller number and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s
(AQAP) unique history and organizational position.70 Drone strikes (Pakistan) also have a
high positive and statistically significant effect on the number of attacks by jihadi groups
worldwide. This result remained the same in two models tested that use different independent
variables for the capture aspect and thus seems robust. Drone strikes (Pakistan) also have a
positive and significant effect on the number of attacks in warzones in five different models
tested. Two Poisson models confirmed this positive effect in another robustness check. These
findings are further supported by the fact that the number of militant deaths (Pakistan) in
drone strikes is also positive and significant for total attacks worldwide and for attacks in
warzones.

These findings indicate the existence of a backlash effect in the face of what is perceived to be
an unjust and unbalanced counter-terrorism tactic. The effect of deaths by drones is not as
large as the simple number of strikes, indicating the backlash is more against the exemplary
tactic than personal vengeance (something we find consistent with the decapitation findings
discussed below). This means that killing is ineffective in this case and thus that we should
reject Hypothesis H1. Moreover, the finding lends to support to Hypothesis H1A, i.e. that
killing is actually counter-productive. However, drone strikes are insignificant for deaths in
coordinated attacks, deaths-per-coordinated attack, and deaths worldwide. This implies drone
strikes have no effect on the organizational capabilities of terrorist groups. Strikes do not,
rather logically, somehow improve organizational effectiveness, but neither do they degrade
organizational effectiveness. Nonetheless, the effect remains positive (i.e. attack quality
increases) and given the sensitivity of significance levels to the variables included in the
model further exploration of this aspect would be beneficial.

In one model tested troop numbers were significant (at nearly the 1 per cent level) for Iraq,
but insignificant for Afghanistan. In Iraq this effect was negative – indicating effectiveness –
but was quite small. Methodologically, troop levels was hard to fit into the regressions
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without introducing biases, but, for what it is worth, the negative and tiny effect was relatively
robust in these models. We believe the small effect as well as the problem with this variable is
due to variations over time. As mentioned earlier, a surge in troop levels increases the number
of targets on the ground for terrorists, thus in the short-term we would expect an increase in
the number of attacks. But over time these attack numbers would decline as the increased
troop numbers successfully combated the terrorists or drove them underground or to countries
with a less intensive counter-terrorism pace. A glance on the, albeit sketchy and somewhat
unreliable, monthly statistics, seems to indicate such a troop-attack surge followed by attack
decline. Thus this variable lends some, albeit weak, support to H1 that killing is effective, if it
is wide-net killing, but exactly how effective, for whom it is effective, and when it becomes
effective is debatable. At the least though, troop surges do not seem counter-productive; thus
we can tentatively reject H1A for this aspect.

Decapitation did not approach near significant levels when tested for influence on the total
number of attacks worldwide, total jihadi attacks worldwide, and attacks in the West. The
effect (both positive and negative) also varies along unexplainable lines. It thus does not help
reject or support the alternative hypotheses, but does imply the tactic is not effective.
However, this variable is – as said above – highly subject to variation based on definitions.
Thus we do not claim this tactic is always ineffective, but that fine-tuned and specific (e.g.
country or campaign) studies would be most appropriate for examining decapitation.

Policing Capture Approach

The most significant tactic within the policing approach is renditions, which has a quite large
negative effect on attacks worldwide. This misses out (but not always by much) on being
statistically significant in three models tested which include defenses as one of the variables,
but in two further models focusing on capturing variables and drone strikes they are
significant (at the 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels). The negative effect remains, but at a lower
level, for worldwide jihadi attacks, but the insignificance returns, in several models tested.
The same is true for attacks in the West. However these both also include defenses in the
analysis. While this does not enable us to reject or accept H1 or H1A, the consistent negative
effect is noteworthy and implies this may be an effective tactic if the specification (or – in
practical terms – the situation) is right.
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And indeed renditions do have a significant and large negative effect on the number of attacks
in warzones across six models (one at less than 10 per cent, four at 5 percent, and one at 1 per
cent).71 This significance of rendition was confirmed in two Poisson models, including one
which used rendition regimes as an alternative specification. This makes sense given
renditions in their nature imply primarily targets in non-western states, out of which the
suspects are extracted. This also helps explain the above complication when defenses, these
being in the West, and renditions are considered together. Thus capturing seems effective if
capturing also means “disappearing” a suspect from their area of main operations. This is
consistent with the backlash hypothesis’ conditions, one of which requires that the trigger be
known to the public and visible.72

Renditions also have a significant (at almost the 5 per cent level) large negative effect on total
deaths in attacks worldwide. Given renditions should (we hope) only target high-value
individuals, this makes sense: the renditions are reducing organizational effectiveness, leading
to less deadly attacks but having a less clear effect on the pace of attacks outside warzones.
Renditions also have a large negative and highly significant (at less than 1 per cent) effect on
number of deaths in coordinated attacks and this significance and effect remains, though at a
slight lower level, for deaths-per-coordinated attack. When considered together we believe
that overall these findings support hypothesis H2, that capturing is effective, but with
qualification that this capturing implies disappearing a person (rendition) and that the effect is
more qualitative globally while quantitative only in front-line GWOT zones.
The necessity of this condition of “disappearing” is reinforced by the fact that arrests in the
West are far from significant for total number of attacks worldwide and total jihadi attacks
worldwide. Total worldwide arrests however do attain significance at less than 5 percent for
number of attacks worldwide and attacks in the West, but the impact is quite small and,
interestingly, positive. In one model for attacks in warzones total arrests again attains
significance (5 per cent level), but again with a very small positive effect. In other models this
slight positive effect of arrests on attack numbers against various target sets seems consistent,
and several of these barely miss out on statistical significance. Arrests of key persons are also
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not significant for world attack totals (but close) for attacks in warzones, though the direction
is still positive.

Thus drawing a conclusion on arrests is difficult. It may be the variable is too aggregated;
other scholars have found arresting people of different levels, character, etc. has different
effects.73 However, when we consider this aggregate mostly includes “foot soldiers”
(assuming the organizations are not overly top-heavy) the consistency of the positive affect is
worrying. We consider this as lending light support to hypothesis H2A: that capturing is
counter-productive. This lends support to the theory lower level “terrorists” are caughtradicalized-and-released, whereupon they become more serious threats. Arrests of key leading
terrorists, on the other hand, may lead to a backlash and more attacks globally, but the
evidence is weak and therefore we consider both H2 and H2A as not supported in the case of
key leaders; their arrests seems not to matter either way.

Lastly, the number of POWs has a very small positive (i.e. more attacks) effect on the total
number of jihadi attacks worldwide, but this is not significant. The same holds for deaths in
coordinated attacks and per-coordinated attack (more or less) as well as for deaths worldwide.
Regarding attacks in warzones, where we would expect capturing POWs to have the most
effect, the insignificance holds for all but one model, and here too the effect is positive. The
consistency of the positive effect, even if small and not significant, is consistent with the
findings of the arrest variable and lends support to hypothesis H2A on the counter-productive
nature of arrests, specifically for lower-level persons. Our Poisson model had a similar result
in that this variable “matters”, but was less useful in revealing in which direction it matters.

Defensive Approach

Possibly the most interesting findings comes when we switch from our offensive focus to
looking at the defensive side of counter-terrorism, which like capturing in more of a policing
approach and, moreover, is more traditional than some of the above policing tactics. We first
found that defenses have a very large positive affect on the number of jihadi attacks
worldwide in three models, with one significant at almost the 5 percent level but the other two
just missing out on significance. Thus, counter-intuitively, defenses seem to increase attack
73
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numbers. The positive effect remains for two of three models on total world attacks but is not
significant. We believe this is due to the soon to be discussed redirection effect being tied
only to the areas in the Middle East.

To explore this unusual finding we looked next at the total number of attacks conducted in the
West. We now found that defenses have a large negative effect with significance at almost the
1 per cent level, i.e. the defenses were making the West safer. Defenses also have a shocking
large negative effect on deaths in coordinated attacks, and at .001 significance level. While
this could be partially driven by 9/11, we should not ignore that there have been concrete
cases of large-scale events foiled by defenses since 9/11; 50 or more according to several
American claims.74 This negative and significant effect retains its influence for the deaths-percoordinated attack, though at more normal levels, but it is still highly significant. Even in
other models where defenses lose significance (e.g. death worldwide) the sign and magnitude
remain the same.

To explain why on a global level the effect is positive despite the negative effects in the West
we need to look at the effect of defenses on total attacks in our specified war zones, recalling
our defense variable is only for average defense levels in specified Western states. For attacks
in war zones we again see a huge positive affect at a high significance levels across six
models.

Thus we can conclude that hypothesis H3 holds only for select states and conditions. Defenses
make the West safer and also overall make it harder to conduct sophisticated multi-prong
attacks, with some indication quality of attacks in general may decline. While this is good,
unfortunately H3A is also supported by this finding and – while not a mutually exclusive
alternative to H3 – sort of trumps it on normative grounds. It seems defenses lead to a shift in
the target set, redirecting terrorists to other more vulnerable target sets even if these are of
lower value (to the West and most jihadi terrorists; not normatively), what game theorists call
target transference and here on a strategic scale. The West thus may be exporting its terrorist
problem to other states, where other persons’ lives pay for the security of western citizens.
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CONCLUSION

The primary findings indicate that both killing and capturing have specific aspects of them
which have large effects – specifically, drone strikes, which seem counter-productive for
counter-terrorism, and renditions, which seem effective. Thus, on balance and simplifying,
policing, albeit a harsh expansion of the traditional form, is the better approach. But this needs
to be qualified. While renditions and their focus on high-value persons seems effective, there
are some indications mass arrests, including of POWs, may be counter-productive. The
reverse is true for killing. Drone strikes (like renditions) focus on high-value persons, but their
effect is positive (more attacks), but the general troop numbers, which is a more wide-net
strategy targeting many persons (like arrests and POWs) have a negative effect over the long
run and thus may be effective. To sum the policy implications then: for an effective counterterrorism strategy kill the foot-soldiers, disappear the leaders; do not engage in mass arrests or
kill or arrest leaders in a public way. This reinforces the aforementioned scholars who find
that the specific targets/suspects really do matter.

However, these effects of offensive tactics were dwarfed by the effect of increased defenses,
which – positively – reduce attacks in the West in quantity and quality while – tragically –
redirecting these attacks to other areas in the world, especially the frontline wars of the
GWOT. Tactical deterrence and (area) denial through traditional but somewhat enhanced
policing thus is an effective policy, but it is less clear if it would be effective if terrorists did
not have substitution options. It is not clear whether this policy of re-direction, of creating
honey-pots that attract terrorists to targets of less value to the state engaging in the counterterrorism policies, is purposive, but game theory and examples from history indicate it is
possible.

As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down it will be interesting to see what new trends
in transnational terrorism emerge, especially with the additional formal end of rendition as a
policy (and even covertly it is likely used less extensively now). These two policies were, as
noted above, the more effective counter-terrorism strategies. Meanwhile drone strikes, which
evidence here indicates are counter-productive, continue unabated. Lastly, following the
revelation of and backlash against the extent of the domestic intelligence gathering in the
West (especially the US), the effectiveness of the re-redirection of terrorism from the West
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through defenses may also warrant reexamination in the coming years, though Syria has
become a new honey-pot for international jihadists.

This study conducted a theoretically rooted empirical examination using aggregate data to
examine the strategic, global level during a specific era of terrorism. We believe this was a
useful and necessary step before further studies lower the level of analysis, put efforts into
disaggregating data to a finer scale, or focus on specific campaigns or countries in the GWOT.
The findings here can help direct these studies and have provided clear and interesting
avenues for future research that can falsify or confirm our broad findings. Despite the
difficulties in data collection and in measuring effectiveness as a policy outcome, the issue of
counter-terrorism is of such importance that this should not prevent us from attempting
research on this topic.75 Even one or two findings, with even small impacts/effects statistically
speaking, can aggregate when put into real-world practice and lead to lives saved as well as
increase the general security and trust in our socio-economic and political system and ideas.
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